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ABSTRACT 
This research answers the question, "What impact did the 2000 election have on low-
income African American voters and how will it affect turnout in future elections?" The 
analysis focuses on the predominately black, low-income community of Parramore and 
examines issues of efficacy related to the 2000 presidential election and beyond. 
The analysis consists of a survey distributed through various community service agencies 
and conducted door-to-door in Parramore. Respondents were asked a series of questions 
related to past voter participation, trust in government, the fairness of the 2000 election and 
perceived future participation. The responses of the survey were compiled into a dataset 
and controlled for race. These data were then compared with the 2000 National Election 
Studies (NES) dataset to determine whether the attitudes in Parramore reflected a national 
trend. 
The analysis showed that nationally, a majority of whites rated the 2000 election as fair and 
the majority of blacks called it unfair. Additionally, blacks have a much lower level of 
trust in the federal government than whites. Historical voting data from NES shows that 
blacks have lower levels of participation than whites and increases in participation have 
occurred only in years when the ballot featured presidential candidates who were perceived 
either very positively or very negatively by the black population. Through use of the NES 
feeling thermometer, the data show that in 2000, blacks were largely motivated by their 
distrust and fear of the Republican candidate, George W. Bush. The feelings of 
111 
disenfranchisement resulting from the election have negatively affected feelings of efficacy 
among blacks, meaning they will be less apt to participate in future elections. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Research conducted with data from the National Election Studies shows that nationally, a 
majority of whites rated the 2000 election as fair and the majority of blacks called it 
unfair. 1 Historically, blacks have a lower level of voting participation than whites and 
increases in participation have occurred only in years when the ballot featured presidential 
candidates who were perceived either very positively or very negatively by the black 
population. In 2000, blacks were largely motivated by their distrust and fear of the 
Republican candidate, George W. Bush. When Bush was declared the winner of the 
election, amid accusations of disenfranchisement of black voters, that distrust was 
confirmed. Therefore, blacks will be much more inclined to have negative opinions about 
fairness indicators from the 2000 election and, correspondingly, they will be less apt to 
participate in future elections. 
African American voters expect little from the voting process. There has never been an 
African American president, there has been only one African American governor and 7 
percent of the 2003 Congress is African American compared to 12 percent of the 
population as a whole. 2 The African American candidate running in the Democratic 
primary for governor of Florida in 2002 attracted just 12 percent of the vote. In a 2000 
1 National Election Studies, http://www. umich. edu/ ~nes/ 
2 2000 US Census Bureau, 
http: //www.prb.org/ AmeristatTemplate.cfm'?Section=RaceandEthnicity&template=/ContentManagement/Con 
tentDisplay.cfm&ContentID0=7822 
1 
National Elections Studies survey, 67 percent of African Americans reported they trusted 
the government only some of the time or none of the time. The figure for whites was 54 
percent. Far from ending during the civil rights wars of the 60s, the struggle for equality is 
a day-to-day challenge for blacks in America. 
The election of 2000 brought questions of discrimination and disenfranchisement back into 
the forefront. Charges of blacks being turned away at polling places because of improper 
identification, ballot boxes being left behind at minority polling places, and erroneous 
listings of ex-felons (who are not allowed to vote in Florida) being distributed to deter the 
black vote, were immediately raised. Minority groups, Democrats and civil liberties 
organizations cried foul. They were joined by much of the mainstream media, non-partisan 
research institutes and a host of lawmakers and congressional committees. While the U.S. 
Supreme Court's precedent setting decision halting a recount of votes in some Florida 
counties effectively decided the election for the Republican candidate George W. Bush, it 
did little to resolve questions of the role of race in the election's outcome. Black votes were 
critical to the process as is evidenced by data from the U.S. Census Bureau. In 2000, the 
white non-Hispanic population constituted the vast majority of the voting age population 
(78 percent), followed by blacks (12 percent), Hispanics (7 percent) and Asians and Pacific 
Islanders (3 percent). 3 According to the Census Bureau, White non-Hispanics had the 
highest level of voter turnout in 2000, (62 percent), followed by blacks (57 percent), 
3 Jamieson, Amie, Shin, Hyon B, Day, Jennifer, US Census Burean, "Voting and Registration in the Election 
of 2000," February 2002, Population Characteristics 
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Hispanics ( 45 percent) and Asian and Pacific islanders ( 43 percent).4 The issue of black 
disenfranchisement is raised in this paper because of the pivotal role blacks played in the 
2000 election and the long history of oppression blacks have in the U.S. 
Even now, more than two years after the fact, questions remain about the impact voting 
irregularities had on the election results. A lawsuit filed by the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) against the state of Florida and some of its 
counties, resulted in agreements from Broward and Leon counties to provide written 
explanations to voters when ballots are rejected. An investigation by the U.S. Commission 
on Civil Rights found "a strong basis" for concluding that violations of Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act (VRA) occurred in Florida. 5 The following conclusions were reported: 
Black voters were significantly more affected than non-blacks by the disenfranchisement of 
Florida's voters: 
• Statewide, based upon county-level statistical estimates, black voters were nearly 
10 times more likely than non-black voters to have their ballots rejected. 
• Approximately 14.4 percent of Florida's black voters cast ballots that were rejected 
compared to approximately 1.6 percent of non-black Florida voters. 
4 Ibid 
5 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Voting Irregularities in Florida During the 2000 Presidential Election 
hnp: i/www.usccr.gov/ 
3 
• Statistical analysis shows that the disparity in ballot spoilage rates-i.e., ballots cast 
but not counted-between black and non-black voters is not the result of education 
or literacy differences. Governor Jeb Bush's Select Task Force on Election 
Procedures, Standards and Technology, found that error rates stemming from 
uneducated, uninformed, or disinterested voters account for less than 1 percent of 
the problems. 
• Approximately 11 percent of Florida voters in 2000 were African American; 
however, African Americans cast about 54 percent of the 180,000 spoiled ballots in 
Florida.6 
Poor counties with large minority populations were more likely to possess voting systems 
with higher spoilage rates than the more affluent counties with significant white 
populations. There is a high correlation between counties and precincts with a high 
percentage of African American voters and the percentage of spoiled ballots. For 
example: 
• Nine of the 10 counties with the highest percentage of African American voters had 
spoilage rates above the Florida average. 
• Of the 10 counties with the highest percentage of white voters, only two counties 
had spoilage rates above the state average. 
• Gadsden County, with the highest rate of spoiled ballots, also had the highest 
percentage of African American voters. 
6 Ibid 
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• Where precinct data were available, the data show that 83 of the 100 precincts with 
the highest numbers of spoiled ballots are black-majority precincts. 7 
The magnitude of the disenfranchisement, including the disparity between black and non-
black voters, is supported by the testimony of witnesses at the Commission's hearings. 
These witnesses include local election officials, poll workers, ordinary voters and activists. 
Among the sworn testimony: 
• One potential voter waited hours at the polls because of a registration mix-up as 
poll workers attempted to call the office of the Supervisor of Elections. The call 
never got through and the individual was not allowed to vote. A former poll worker 
herself, she testified that she never saw anything like it during her 18 years as a poll 
worker. 
• A poll worker in Miami-Dade County with 15 years of experience testified, "By far 
this was the worst election I have ever experienced. After that election, I decided I 
didn't want to work as a clerk anymore." 
• A Broward County poll worker testified that in past elections it took about 10 
minutes to get through to the elections supervisor. During the course of the 
November 2000 election, she turned away approximately 40-50 potential voters 
because she could not access the supervisor of elections. 
7 Ibid 
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• A Boynton Beach poll worker explained how his precinct workers turned away 
about 30-50 potential voters because they could not get through to the supervisor of 
elections. He was successful only once during an eight-hour period.8 
• The NAACP also alleged that imposters claiming to be from the organization called 
African American households before the election asking them to vote for George 
Bush. The NAACP disavowed the calls claiming their non-partisan stance. 9 
After a series of lawsuits, legal filings and impassioned arguments by all sides, the case 
ultimately ended up in the hands of the U.S. Supreme Court which cleared the way for 
Bush to assume the presidency, even though final national popular vote tallies put him 
behind Gore by 539,947 votes. 10 
Black civil rights leader Jesse Jackson immediately disavowed the decision by the court 
and was joined in his outrage by hundreds of blacks and Democratic loyalists. 
At a Tallahassee rally the day after the Supreme Court announcement, Jackson said, "The 
election was essentially taken and stolen. You must get your votes in the public booth, not 
the private chambers of judges who are your political allies. Today, the emperor has no 
clothes and no shame." 11 
8 Ibid 
9 Ibid 
10 CNN, Election 2000 - http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/ 
11 
"Black Democrats Angered by Supreme Court Ruling," Dec. 13, 2000, 
http://www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/12/13/african.americans/index.html 
6 
David A. Bositis, a research associate at the Joint Center for Political and Economic 
Studies in Washington, DC, a think tank that studies African American issues, said after the 
election that Bush's image was perhaps irreparably damaged among blacks. 
"Even though George W. Bush won, his status is at least somewhat clouded by what 
happened in Florida and what happened in Florida would not have happened without the 
black vote."12 
What are the long-term implications of these problems? The African American vote is 
increasingly being courted by the two major political parties. The role of black votes or the 
lack thereof is still being debated in the 2002 Republican midterm election sweep. 13 If this 
critical element of the population has even less faith in the system as a result of the 2000 
election, specific strategies will have to be developed to harness that frustration and tum it 
into participation before 2004. If not, the ideal of equal participation and representation 
will remain just that. 
12 Kiely, Eugene, "Study Finds Major Rise in Black Vote," 
http://inq.philly.com/conte ... er/2001/01/16/front_page/BLACKVOTE16.htm 
13Crockett, Stephanie, "It's Too Early to Blame Black Voters for Republican Sweep, Experts Say" 
http ://www.bct.com/artic lcs/1,.c 1gb4477-51 85. 00 .html 
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CHAPTER TWO: MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Historically, African Americans have lower voter turnout rates than the population as a 
whole. This has been attributed to several factors, particularly to a lack of efficacy 
experienced by members of that group. This paper will explore trends in turnout among 
members of this group compared to the total population, focusing specifically on the 
impact of efforts to boost participation prior to 2000. My primary data source is a survey 
developed to gauge levels of political efficacy and the impact of the 2000 election in the 
Parramore community of Orlando - a historically black, low-income neighborhood. 
Survey respondents include clients of the Central Florida Coalition for the Homeless, a 
non-profit organization that provides food and shelter to qualified low-income individuals; 
Workforce Central Florida, a non-profit organization that aids the state and federal 
governments in local workforce development and welfare reform; and clients of the 
Callahan Neighborhood Center, a multi-use city recreational facility located in the heart of 
Parramore. 
Survey questions and values include: 
• Vote-Are you currently registered to vote, yes, no or don't know? 
• Vote 00-Did you vote in the 2000 presidential race, yes, no or don't know? 
• History- Have you voted in any other presidential race, yes, no or don't know? 
• Vote 04 - Do you plan to vote in the 2004 presidential race, yes, no or don't know? 
8 
• Fair- Do you believe the 2000 presidential race was fairly decided, yes, no or don't 
know? 
• Equal- Do you believe that every vote carries equal weight, yes, no or don't know? 
• Equalele - Do you believe that every citizen in this country has an equal chance of 
being elected to political office, yes, no or don't know? 
• F edright - How often do you trust federal government to do what is right, just about 
always, most of the time, some of the time or almost never? 
• Locright - How often do you trust local government to do what is right, just about 
always, most of the time, some of the time or almost never? 
Results of the Parramore survey suggest that survey respondents overwhelmingly felt the 
2000 election was unfair, that votes cast by blacks were not fairly counted and that every 
citizen of this country does not has an equal opportunity to hold public office. While the 
majority indicated they would participate in 2004, data from the 2002 midterm elections 
and the 2003 mayor's race in Orlando paint a different picture. 
I used to the Parramore data as a yardstick against which to measure a national random 
sample. Would a national sample show similar characteristics - that black voters would be 
more inclined than whites to find the 2000 election unfair, that indicators such as trust in 
the federal government would be lower for blacks than for whites and that participation 
among blacks would be higher in 2000 than in 1996? 
To make these determinations I turned to the National Election Studies (NES) pre- and 
post- 2000 election data, focusing on the question of the fairness of the 2000 election and 
9 
controlling for race, education, income and partisanship. I then looked at the trust question 
and the participation in 1996 and 2000. 
However, to fully understand the issues of African American participation, it is essential to 
start with an historical perspective. By beginning with a look at the unique issues blacks 
have faced in securing a political voice in this country, examining the Parramore 
community as a case study and using national data to analyze questions of fairness posed 
after the 2000 election, this paper will show that the record-high participation of blacks in 
the 2000 election is not likely to continue in 2004. 
10 
CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Analysis of voting and race has necessarily focused on a historical perspective. Indeed it is 
impossible to separate the issues. Early works have focused on attitudes cultivated during 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when blacks were routinely looked upon as inferior 
to whites. 14 In a 1942 study by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), more than 
half the whites surveyed assumed that blacks were less intelligent than whites. A book 
published in that era addressed the nation's treatment of blacks as a moral issue and 
contrasted the treatment of blacks with the promise of democracy. An American Dilemma: 
The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy by Gunnar Myrdal documented 
discrimination toward blacks and spurred additional works detailing disparities in housing, 
education, life expectancy and other key indicators. 
By the 1990s, an array of academic journals focused exclusively on black politics. The 
National Political Science Review, (published by the National Association of Black 
Political Scientists), The Black Scholar, The Black Politician, Black World, Journal of 
Black Politics, Journal of Black Studies, Western Journal of Black Studies, National 
Minority Politics, Review of Black Political Economy, Transitions, The Crisis: A Record of 
14 Schuman, Howard, Steeh, Charlotte, Bobo, Lawrence, Racial Attitudes in America, Trends and 
Interpretations, Harvard University Press, 1985, page 8 
11 
the Darker Races, Journal of Ethnic Studies and Phy/on: The Atlanta University Review of 
Race and Culture are among the more prominent publications. 15 
Black studies grew as an academic discipline during the 70s and 80s. The 1989 publication 
of A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society, edited by Gerald David Jaynes and 
Robin N. Williams, added substantially to published literature in the field. The book 
reviews literature on racial segregation, racial attitudes and behavior, black social 
institutions, black political participation, black economic performance, black public health 
and black educational achievement. 16 
The Politics of Race: African Americans and the Political System by Theodore Rueter 
focuses on the impact of race and politics. He traces black political influence from its 
earliest days - the Reconstruction. During that time, the black vote in the North became 
more powerful as disenfranchised blacks left the South. Even in the South, under the 
protection of federal troops, blacks ran for office and, from 1867 until 1876-77 when those 
troops were removed, about 800 were elected. 17 But while the 15th amendment to the 
Constitution, ratified in 1870, allowed the federal gove~ent to legislate election 
standards and prohibited the infringement of that right for race or color, many Southern 
states began developing other standards for the sole purpose of removing blacks from the 
voting pool. Terrorism, poll taxes, literacy tests, good citizenship tests and grandfather 
15 Rueter, Theodore, The Politics of Race, African Americans and the Political System, 1995, M.E. Sharpe, 
Inc, page 5. 
16 Ibid, page 6 
17 US Bureau of the Census 1979: 155 
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clauses are just a few of the tactics used to keep blacks at home on election days. As 
disparities were aired, signs of progress began to be seen. 
In 1904 the black National Liberty Party was organized and supported a candidate, George 
Edwin Taylor, for president. 18 
In 1948, at the Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia, Hubert Humphrey, then 
mayor of Minneapolis, encouraged the party to "leave the dark light of states' rights and 
enter the bright light of civil rights." As Humphrey spoke, Senator Strom Thurmond of 
South Carolina led a convention walkout. He formed his own party and ran for president as 
a "Dixiecrat." 19 
In 1960, black votes were critical to John Kennedy's 110,000-vote margin of victory over 
Richard Nixon. The Gallup Poll estimated that 70 percent of black voters supported 
Kennedy. Black support could have given Kennedy the margin of victory in 11 states 
(Illinois, New Jersey, Michigan, South Carolina, Texas, Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, 
North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Nevada.)20 That year also saw the formation of the 
Afro-American party which ran two blacks, the Reverend Clennon King and Reginald 
Carter, for president and vice president. The party, which was organized in Alabama, 
received 1,485 votes, all from that state. 
18 Rueter, Theordore, The Politics of Race, African Americans and the Political System, 1995, M.E. Sharpe, 
Inc, page 1 7. 
19 Ibid 
20 Ibid 
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Largely due to Governor George Wallace of Alabama, race was even more prominent in 
the 1964 campaign. As governor, Wallace openly opposed desegregation and, in 1962, 
opposed desegregation of the University of Alabama. When he ran against President 
Lyndon Johnson for the Democratic presidential nomination, he received 30 percent of the 
vote in the Indiana primary and 43 percent of the vote in the Maryland primary, showing 
that his message resonated, even in the north. 21 
By 1968 there were several black candidates in the running, including Eldridge Cleaver, 
minister of information for the Black Panther Party, actor/activist Dick Gregory and 
Reverend Channing Phillips, who was nominated at the Democratic convention by the 
District of Columbia delegation. 22 George Wallace ran again, this time with the American 
Independent Party. He won five states: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana and 
Mississippi. The ultimate victor, Richard Nixon, focused on winning Southern, white, 
conservative Democratic votes by making "law and order" one of his central issues. Critics 
claimed the tactic was racially coded. 23 
In fact, race is credited as being one of the fundamental causes of the string of Republican 
victories beginning in 1968.24 In 1972 George Wallace ran yet again, however his 
campaign was cut short when he was shot in Laurel, Maryland in May 1972. 
21 Ibid, page 18 
22 Ibid 
23 Ibid 
24 Waynes, Stephen J. and Wilcox, Clyde, The Election of the Century, 2002, M.E. Sharpe, "The Incorrigibly 
White Republican Party: Racial Politics in the Presidential Race, Jeremy D. Mayer, page 45 
14 
Representative Shirley Chisholm, a Harlem Democrat, became the first "serious" black 
candidate to compete for the Democratic nomination. She entered ten primaries (including 
Florida) and averaged 35,000 votes in each state. She received 35 convention delegates or 
7 percent of the total black delegates. 25 
George Wallace returned in 1976, and Florida played a pivotal role in the outcome. 
Wallace lost to former Georgia governor Jimmy Carter in the Florida Democratic primary 
and Democratic officials, who were nervous about Wallace's message and his popularity, 
threw their support behind Carter. Nearly two-thirds of registered black voters went to the 
polls and 90 percent of them supported Carter.26 
Ronald Reagan defeated Carter in 1980 and began a less then hopeful era for civil rights 
advocates. He opposed affirmative action and the extension of the Voting Rights Act; 
reduced federal domestic spending, supported tax-exemptions for segregated schools and 
reduced taxes for the wealthy. 
In 1984 Jesse Jackson entered the national arena, receiving 19 percent of the total primary 
vote in his bid for the Democratic presidential nomination. Many blacks, however, 
supported Walter Mondale for his record of supporting black causes. Ronald Reagan won 
by a landslide. 
25 Ibid, page 19 
26 Ibid 
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Jackson sought the Democratic nomination again in 1988 and, although he won primaries 
in five states, he lost the nomination to Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts. The 
Republican candidate, George Bush, ran on a series of race-based issues (crime, welfare, 
affirmative action) and drew national attention for a series of incendiary ads he ran 
focusing on the case of Willie Horton, a black convict who, while on furlough from a 
Massachusetts prison, raped a white woman and stabbed her fiance. Bush blamed 
Dukakis's policies for Horton's release and won handily. 
Bush's record with blacks went from bad to worse during his presidency. By the 1992 
campaign, a poll by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies showed that 84 
percent of blacks disapproved of Bush's performance. Democratic contender Bill Clinton, 
on the other hand, carried 82 percent of the black vote during the general election. 
The strategy of the black voting bloc changed during the 1992 election. Black leaders 
waited to express their demands until after Clinton's election, possibly helping him win by 
deferring speculation that he might capitulate to the needs of a group still viewed 
suspiciously by a large segment of the population. Clinton made substantial inroads in 
inclusiveness and won easily in 1996. His term helped lay the groundwork for the election 
of 2000, a pivotal event for race relations and power politics. 
In 2000, Republicans shifted their traditional strategy,_ which was to win enough white 
votes to beat the Democratic advantage among non-whites.27 George W. Bush had 
27 Mayer, page 45 
16 
received a relatively high level of black support in his race for Texas governor in 1998 (28 
percent) and strategists thought he had a good chance of overcoming the presumptive 
Democratic nominee, Al Gore, whose record in the black community was not nearly as 
strong as his predecessor, Bill Clinton's. The prevailing theory was a Republican who 
could take 28 percent of the black vote and half of the Hispanic vote (another area in which 
Bush was strong) would have an easy path to the White House. 28 However, Bush walked 
a tightrope in his efforts to balance the image he was crafting as a "new Republican" - one 
who would reach out to the minority community - with the white conservative base of the 
Republican Party. The difficulty quickly became apparent. 
In the battle for the Republican nomination, Bush took on Arizona Sen. John McCain who 
won the first primary, in New Hampshire, by a large margin. In the next race, in South 
Carolina, both candidates were immediately confronted with two potentially explosive 
issues - the use of the Confederate flag and interracial dating.29 Bush was able to avoid 
the flag controversy by labeling it a "states rights" issue. But he injected himself into the 
interracial dating controversy with a visit to ultra-conservative Bob Jones University, which 
maintained that interracial dating was against God's will. While Bush's appearance at the 
school prompted considerable angst among some of the party's more moderate members, it 
28 Ibid, page 46 
29 Ibid, page 4 7 
17 
didn't seem to harm Bush in the state as he won a strong victory as a traditional 
. 30 
conservative. 
In the Democratic primaries, Gore was struggling to reclaim even a portion of the black 
support that Bill Clinton mustered in the 1990s. In fact, Clinton and Jimmy Carter, the 
only two successful Democratic presidential candidates in the last two decades, were 
nominated largely as a result of their mobilization of the black vote. Gore was having more 
trouble. Blacks recalled his attempts to appeal to conservative whites in 1988. He attacked 
Jesse Jackson during the New York primaries and, like George Bush, Sr., attempted to use 
the Willie Horton case against Michael Dukakis. Gore's primary challenger, Bill Bradley, 
pushed the race issue in an attempt to shore up support from Democratic base voters. But 
Gore's association with Clinton won out in the end and Bradley lost in state after state, 
rejected soundly by blacks. 
After the primary, Gore was advised to campaign strongly in the black community. 
Counter to that advice he focused more on appealing to centrist whites he thought he could 
sway from the Republicans. Blacks criticized him for giving up on them and he was 
roundly bashed after his first televised debate with Bush for not dealing with the race issue. 
As black radio show host Tom Joyner lamented in a post-debate interview with Gore: 
30 Ibid, page 48 
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We've got these people registered to vote, we've got people fired up ... but last night 
during the debate, neither one of you addressed issues for us, for African Americans ... I 
didn't hear anything about affirmative action ... we didn't hear about racial profiling, we 
didn't hear about reparations ... all these things that affect us we heard nothing about. 31 
During the third debate, Gore came out with a strong statement against quotas but endorsed 
affirmative action. Bush opposed affirmative action measures that involve quotas. 32 
Bush's record on race relations was questionable. Former GOP activist Faye Anderson 
said Bush "would surround himself by black babies, but would not go to speak to black 
adults, it really tipped his hand to what he is all about - trying to convince white swing 
voters that he is a different kind of candidate. "33 
Both parties took extraordinary measures to appeal to black voters. The Republicans spent 
more than a million dollars on radio ads targeted at the black community and Bush became 
the first Republican candidate to attend an NAACP convention since 1980. 34 
But it was the Democrats the NAACP sought to help with an unprecedented advertising 
campaign designed to bring back the raw emotions of the civil rights era. The most 
inflammatory ad featured the daughter of James Byrd, Jr., a black man who was tied to a 
truck by his ankles and dragged to his death during Bush's term as Texas governor. Three 
white men were convicted of the crime. Byrd's daughter chastised Bush for not following 
31 Tom Joyner Radio Show, Oct. 4, 2000 
32 Ramstack, Tom, "Clinton Orders Increase in Hispanic Workers," Washington Times, October 20, 2000 
33 Neal, Terry M., "In Outreach to Blacks, A GOP Credibility Gap," Washington Post, June 13, 2000, Al. 
34 Mayer, page 53 
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up on the convictions by supporting hate crimes legislation. The NAACP followed up on 
the ads by arranging for the daughter to speak to black audiences across the country. 35 
Even more significant, the NAACP launched its largest-ever voting drive, clearly geared 
toward motivating Democrats to vote. And it worked. In 2000, 73 percent of registered 
blacks voted, the highest ever turnout among blacks in the U.S. 
What caused the upswing in participation? David Shipler, author of A Country of 
Strangers, takes issue with stereotypes that paint blacks as being poorly educated and not 
well informed politically that he maintains can foster low levels of engagement among 
blacks. He describes them as "measurements of a cruel wind that whips across America." 36 
The consequence of such thinking creates "a corrosive chemistry of low expectations, 
closed opportunities and ultimate defeat," he writes. "The judgments that spring from the 
stereotypes become self-fulfilling prophecies, creating a reality of failure that is then taken 
to justify the stereotypes themselves." 37 
Shipler stresses that a sense of efficacy is critical to success. He focuses on the images 
whites and blacks have of each other and how those images can deter social progress. 
While racial progress has been made on some levels, he argues that true integration, which 
he describes as genuine power sharing, has largely failed. "In most institutions, (the armed 
35 Mayer, page 56 
36 Ibid, page 3 77 
37 Ibid 
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forces are the chief exception), power is still reserved for whites, and a belief in black 
cultural inferiority has subtly substituted for the earlier belief in black genetic inferiority."38 
Shipler delves deeper into the psychology behind the anger an oppressed minority 
cultivates toward the more powerful majority. He describes the effort of honoring a 
cultural heritage while making decisions to achieve success in the world as one that "tears 
at black souls."39 And that, he says, begins to explain black anger at efforts toward "color 
blindness." The acknowledgement of genuine differences in culture and heritage is critical 
to validating the perspective brought by blacks to the U.S. culture.40 "The real quagmires 
of blacks' impotence (lie in) their tightly circumscribed political influence and their hollow 
. ,,41 
economic stature. 
The academic literature has not yet completely examined the residual anger from the 2000 
election, nor has it predicted its impact on voter efficacy in the future. While much has 
been written about the episode, the material has largely been relegated to newspaper 
accounts, magazine articles and Internet postings. The events of Sept. 11, 2001, occurring 
less than a year after the election, largely quelled any further election debate and focused 
the nation's attention on unity rather than anything that could be interpreted as fractious. 
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid, page 3 83 
41 Ibid 
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Among those who have written on the issue, The Black Radical Congress maintains that 
the biggest loser in the election was the principle of democracy. 
The electoral contest between the two major candidates of the capitalist parties, George W. 
Bush and Al Gore, was essentially decided not by the people, but by the Republican-
controlled Florida State Legislature and by five conservative justices on the U.S. Supreme 
Court. In effect, Gore was elected by the voters, while Bush was selected by the courts. 42 
The sting was especially strong because of the diligence with which the African American 
vote was cultivated in 2000. Concerned about the impending loss of a Democratic 
president, myriad African American action groups set out to register and inform record 
numbers of minority voters. The most notable was the NAACP drive. 43 
Nationally it identified 2.8 million households that it contacted with literature and phone 
calls. Bill Maxwell, a black columnist for The St. Petersburg Times, wrote of the impact of 
that effort in October, 2000. 
While listening to a popular South Florida black radio station the other day, I nearly drove 
my Blazer off the road when I heard this political ad: 'Look, we know what you think 
Republicans are like, but we 're working hard to show you who we really are.' This 
groundbreaking radio spot is paid for by none other than the Republican National 
Committee. For good reason, even RNC spokesman Clifford May calls the ad 'absolutely 
historic and unprecedented.' Never in the history of contemporary voting have blacks, as a 
voting bloc, been courted directly by Republicans. 44 
42 Black Radical Congress press release: "Racism and the Fight for Democracy," 
www.blackradicalcongress.org/ comm/press/releaseo 1o9o1 /html 
43 Ibid 
44 Maxwell, Bill, "Both Parties fight for the black vote," The St. Petersburg Times, October 18, 2000, 
www.sptimes.com/N ews/ 101800/0pinion/Both__parties _fight_ fo. shtml 
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The efforts did have an effect. In addition to the largest-ever national turnout amongst 
black voters, the black share of the overall vote in Florida rose to 15 percent in 2000 from 
10 percent in 1996,45 meaning 300,000 more black voters participated. 46 Nationally the 
black share of the vote was 10 percent. 47 Al Gore received 90 percent of that vote.48 
Given this context, I selected a Central Florida community as a case study for the purpose 
of studying the impact of the 2000 election. Parramore is predominantly African American 
(90 percent), comprised almost entirely of renters (88 percent), and extremely poor (overall 
poverty rate of 47 percent). In some of the census tracts that define the neighborhood, 
poverty rates are in excess of 60 percent. The average Parramore resident survives on less 
than half of the annual income available to the average Orlando resident. Marriage rates 
are low; rates of female heads of household are high; labor force participation and 
educational attainment are well below the regional averages. Parramore has become a 
focal point for community service centers in the city, yet many residents have developed a 
sense of cynicism about "improvement" and "redevelopment" projects planned for their 
neighborhood. Thirty percent of the 45 respondents surveyed felt that local government 
could be trusted to do the right thing "always" or "most of the time." Despite the presence 
45 
"Study Finds Major Rise in Black Vote," 
http://inq.philly.com/conte ... er/2001/01/16/front_page/BLACKVOTE16.htm 
46 Rakove, John, The Unfinished Election of 2000, Basic Books, 2001, page 92 
47 Bositis, David A., The Black Vote in 2000: A Preliminary Analysis, December 2000, The Joint Center for 
Political and Economic Studies, www.jointcenter.org 
48 
"Study Finds Major Rise in Black Vote," 
http://inq.philly.com/conte ... er/2001/01/16/front_page/BLACKVOTE16.htm 
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of numerous agencies, service centers, and other "helping" facilities, the people of 
Parramore are generally no better off than they were ten or twenty years ago. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDY 
Residents of Parramore, an impoverished Orlando neighborhood whose original boundaries 
are being encroached upon by the region's busiest interstate, the city's largest urban 
redevelopment project and two major sports facilities, are accustomed to outsiders offering 
promises in exchange for access, opinions or land. 
In 2000 Parramore residents were offered yet another series of promises, this time in return 
for votes. As the Bush and Gore campaigns, seeking every possible advantage, culled 
through Parramore's large cache of unregistered voters, residents were promised brighter 
days ahead with improved opportunities for education, insurance and employment. Gaining 
a consensus in a community such as Parramore is complicated, however, by characteristics 
unique to low-income communities: high percentages of transients; a tendency not to send 
change of address forms to the Supervisor of Elections; and an overall lack of faith in the 
"system." 
In order to document community views on issues related to the 2000 election, I developed a 
survey addressing various measurable attitudes listed earlier in this text. Several attempts 
were made to distribute this survey to assure the most representative results. In August 
2001 I distributed the questionnaire to clients of the Central Florida Homeless Coalition, 
located in the heart of Parramore, where eligible visitors can receive temporary housing and 
meals. Since I have volunteered in the coalition's food service program, I was aware of the 
large numbers of coalition residents who qualify for the meal program. On the designated 
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Sunday evening I explained my purpose in conducting the survey to nearly 200 residents 
there to receive the evening meal. I handed out approximately 40 surveys and let the 
residents fill them out at their leisure. I collected the surveys after the meal ended. When 
sorting through the responses I noticed that while the respondents were primarily low 
income, many came from outside of the Parramore area. 
In September 2001, in a second attempt to obtain a representative sample, I contacted the 
Workforce Central Florida, an organization that places qualified low-income applicants in 
jobs. My surveys were distributed with application materials over the course of a week and 
returned to me, in bulk, the next week. This approach generated a good response (83 ), 
but many respondents turned out to be Hispanics and residents of other neighborhoods. 
Again, it was apparent another strategy was called for. 
Finally, in March 2002, with the help of six undergraduate student recruits, we traversed 
the Parramore neighborhood one hot Saturday morning, going door to door and person to 
person and speaking with residents one on one. Some residents filled out the forms 
themselves while others allowed us to mark their responses for them. This effort produced 
the core of the information compiled in the Parramore dataset. The final respondent list 
from all three attempts was 162 surveys, however once they were edited to assure 
Parramore residency, the total was reduced to 45. 
Although the response was relatively small, the information was telling. 
In that survey, 52 percent of those questioned (48 percent black) felt the election was unfair 
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while only 36 percent (38 percent black) felt it was fair. 
Table 1: Fairness of 2000 election by race, Parramore survey sample, N=33 
White Black Total 
Yes 25% 
No 75% 
DK 
Total 100% 
37.9% 
48.3% 
12.1% 
100% 
36.4% 
51.5% 
12.1% 
100% 
Crosstabulating that data by education level, one finds that the few whites who were 
surveyed were overwhelmingly in agreement that the election was unfair. Black 
respondents with a high school education were more inclined to call it unfair (53 percent) 
than either those with less or more education (33 percent each). 
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Table 2: Fairness of 2000 Election by race, controlled for education, Parramore survey 
sample, N=31 
<HS Do you believe that 2000 pres election was fairly 
decided? 
Total 
White Black 
yes 33.3% 25.0% 
no 33.3% 50.0% 
dk 33.3% 25.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
HS Do you believe that 2000 pres election was fairly 
decided? 
Total 
>HS Do you believe that 2000 pres election was fairly 
decided? 
Total 
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yes 33.3% 40.0% 38.9% 
no 66.7% 53.3% 55.6% 
dk 6.7% 5.6% 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
yes 44.4% 44.4% 
no 33.3% 33.3% 
dk 22.2% 22.2% 
100.0% 100.0% 
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Figure 1: Percent Calling Election "Unfair," by Race 
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In a related statistic, 60 percent of those surveyed in Parramore did not feel votes cast by 
blacks were fairly counted in the 2000 election. And 48 percent felt there were efforts made 
to disproportionately keep blacks from voting or to invalidate black votes. 
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Table 3: Question of whether votes cast by blacks in 2000 election were fairly counted, 
Parramore survey sample, N= 43 
Valid Percent 
yes 20.9% 
no 62.8% 
dk 16.3% 
Total 100.0% 
Table 4: Question of whether efforts were made to disproportionately keep blacks from 
voting or to invalidate black votes, Parramore survey sample, N=36 
Valid Percent 
yes 47.6% 
no 35.7% 
dk 16.7% 
Total 100.0% 
In Parramore, 44 percent of those surveyed indicated they voted in 2000. 
Table 5: Did respondent vote in 2000 presidential election, Parramore survey sample, 
N=43 
Valid Percent 
Yes 44.2% 
No 55.8% 
Total 100.0% 
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Controlling for race we see that 52 percent of those who voted were black. 
Table 6: Did respondent vote in 2000 presidential election, Parramore survey sample, 
N=35 
White Black 
Yes 25.0% 51.6% 
No 75.0% 48.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
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Figure 2: Percent of Parramore respondents voting in 2000, by race. 
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Looking forward to the 2004 race, we see that of the 68 percent who indicate they will 
vote in 2004, 64 percent are black. 
Table 7: Respondents' plans to vote in 2004 presidential election, Parramore survey 
sample, N= 35 
Valid Percent 
Yes 68.3% 
No 17.1% 
DK 14.6% 
Total 100.0% 
Table 8: Respondents' plans to vote in 2004 presidential election, by race, Parramore 
survey sample, N=33 
Yes 
No 
DK 
Total 
White Black 
12.1% 63.6% 
12.1% 
12.1% 
12.1% 
87.9% 
Twenty two percent of respondents to this survey rated the atmosphere of their polling 
places as being intimidating and, during a community meeting, several residents questioned 
notification of a polling place change just prior to the election. Residents ovetwhelmingly 
endorsed the idea of voter education in the neighborhood. Above all, they expressed a 
desire to be part of any change. Too often, they say, they feel they are used in various 
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agency efforts to secure grant money or ensure political success. 
After the election was over, little had changed. Except a world-weary neighborhood had 
received another lesson in how the system really works. 
One 53-year-old African American man who has lived in Parramore for more than a decade 
has no doubt who really won the election. "Bush stole it from Gore," he responded to a 
survey question. "And Kathleen Harris did the dirty work." How does this make him feel 
about voting in subsequent elections? "The rich want the poor man to be down," he 
explained. "But the poor people haven't forgotten. It's a feeling that travels through the 
community." The man said he did not plan to vote in 2004. 
Another resident, a 38-year-old black man, wrote: "I've always had my doubts about the 
way votes were tallied and how certain groups actually decide the outcome. The past 
election proved that my doubts were more than just a feeling." The man said he did not 
participate in 2000 and had no intention of participating in future elections. 
A 42-year-old black man who was generally pleased with city services but had absolutely 
no trust in the federal government responded: "I truly believe in the American government 
'system', but because of the corrupt persons involved it makes the average citizen 
unwilling to participate ... Our own citizens lack faith in our own government. It is not 
necessarily my opinion, but what a great deal of us see with our own eyes! There's talk, 
but only a few of us will voice their opinions." 
A 35-year old Native American woman who also had more trust in local government than 
33 
the federal government wrote: "I believe the last presidential election was decided by 
unseen, underground factions that used undesirable methods unknown to the general public 
to throw the vote to the Republican's side." 
And a 59-year-old black man: "As long as it took, they could have done it all over. It 
wasn't fair." 
Why do Parramore residents have these attitudes and how will they affect future 
participation? In a special report to the National Election Studies (NES) Board, based on 
the 2000 NES Special Topic Pilot Study, Nancy Bums and Donald Kinder developed a 
formula for determining the relationship between three kinds of social trust. The results are 
coded on a zero-one interval, with one showing the most trust and zero the least. It is clear 
from the study that blacks and whites varied dramatically in general trust and workplace 
trust but that the differences practically disappeared in the category of neighborhood trust. 
Table 9: The Relationship between Three Varieties of Social Trust and Social 
Background Characteristics (means) Bums-Kinder. Scale coded on zero-one interval, 
with 1.0 representing most trusting and 0.0 least trusting. 
White 
Black 
General Trust 
.67 
.46 
Neighborhood Trust Workplace Trust 
.69 
.66 
.67 
.56 
Bums and Kinder then developed a scale to measure the effect of general trust on political 
34 
participation. The conclusion indicates that general trust has a significant impact on 
political participation and organizational activity as a whole, but a very limited role in 
predicting local participation. 
Table 10: Does general trust predict political participation? (Bums-Kinder.) Coefficient 
and standard error on general trust. 
Participation 
Local participation 
Organizational activity 
Full Sample 
.32 (.22) 
.03 (.11) 
.26 (0.07) 
People with Full-Time Jobs 
.28 (0.28) 
-.01 (0.15) 
.32 (0.09) 
The study shows that the area of general trust has a significant influence on political 
participation. Since blacks rate 21 percent lower in that area than whites, it is not 
surprising that residents of communities like Parramore would be far less inclined to 
participate politically than majority white communities. 
The Parramore data cause me to hypothesize that a random national sample would find 
comparable levels of frustration and low levels of trust. In the next section I will compare 
results of the Parramore survey with national survey data. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS 
How much have attitudes about race changed over the years? In a 1990 survey, the 
National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago (NORC) found that 57 
percent of non-blacks rated blacks as "less intelligent than whites." 49 
This study examines the strength of black political power through voting data. In order to 
establish a national benchmark, statistics from the National Election Study are used. 
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Figure 3: Voter Turnout 1948-2000, Percent among Demographic Groups who 
responded: "Yes, voted" 
The 73 percent voting participation by blacks in 2000 is rivaled for record high by two 
distinct time periods - 68 percent turnout in the midst of the civil rights struggles of 1968 
and 67 percent turnout in 1980 and 1992, both years in which candidates seen as "pro-
black" were elected. 
49 Duberman, Martin, Left Out, The Politics of Exclusion/Essays/1964-1999, pg. 376 
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These elections were followed by periods of lower participation among blacks - a drop of 
three percentage points between 1968 and 1972, and 1968 and 1976, and a drop of seven 
percentage points between 1980 and 1988 - when George Bush Sr. won over Democrat 
Michael Dukakis. 
This analysis comes from the 2000 post-election study conducted by the National Election 
Studies at the University of Michigan. The primary variable is a question asked in that 
survey: How fair was the November Election? Frequency distribution for this variable 
shows that 63 percent of those surveyed found the election to be either fair or neither fair 
nor unfair and 37 percent found it to be unfair. 
Table 11: Fairness of 2000 Election, National Election Studies sample, N= 1418 
Valid Percent 
Fair or neither fair/unfair 
Unfair 
Total 
62.9% 
37.1% 
100.0% 
Looking at the effect of race on the fairness variable shows a distinct difference between 
blacks and whites. Fifty six percent of blacks called the election unfair compared to 34 
percent of whites. 
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Table 12: Fairness of 2000 election, by race, National Election Studies sample, N=1277 
White Black 
Fair or neither 
fair/unfair 
Unfair 
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Figure 4: Percent of Parramore respondents rating 2000 election 'unfair.' 
Since blacks have traditionally been motivated to vote by extreme like or dislike of a 
candidate, I examined both pre- and post-election feeling thermometers for George W. 
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Bush. Before the election, the mean thermometer rating for Bush by blacks was 48, 
compared to a mean of 58 for whites. 
Table 13: Pre:Election Feeling Thermometer for George W Bush, National Election 
Studies sample, N= 1562 
Race: White/ 
Black 
1. White 
2. Black 
Total 
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Figure 5: Pre-Election thermometer, George W. Bush 
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2. Black 
The post-election thermometer for Bush is even more revealing, with whites giving him 
an increased rating of 59 and the black rating falling to 39. 
Table 14: Post: Election Feeling Thermometer for George W Bush, National Election 
Studies sample, N=1383 
Race: White 
/Black 
White 
Black 
Total 
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Figure 5. Post-election thermometer, George W. Bush 
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2. Black 
The 2002 National Opinion Poll, conducted by the Joint Center for Political and Economic 
Studies, found that in 2000 Bush's favorable rating among blacks was 29 percent, and his 
unfavorable rating 55 percent. However, in 2002, those numbers increased dramatically, as 
he was rated favorably by 50.8 percent of blacks and unfavorably by 38.6 percent. They 
were still considerably lower than the rating by the general population, of which 72.8 
percent viewed him favorably and 23.6 percent unfavorably. 50 
On the question of political trust, we see that a large percentage of blacks surveyed in 2000, 
59 percent, have a low level of political trust as compared to 55 percent of whites. 
Table 15: Two categories of political trust by race, National Election Studies sample, 
N=1275 
White . Black Total 
Low 54.6% 59.2% 55.1 % 
High 45.4% 40.8% 44.9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
50 Bositis, David A., 2002 National Opinion Poll, Politics, Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, 
www.jointcenter.org 
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Figure 6: Percent with low political trust by race. 
Is race the only factor that accounts for these stark differences? To check I ran the same 
tests controlling for education, income and party affiliation. We can see very clearly that 
although education does play a role in the results, its role is one of enhancement of the race 
variable. For those with less than a high school education, 45 percent of whites and 65 
percent of blacks found the election unfair. For those with a high school education, the 
numbers changed slightly to 44 percent of whites and 64 percent of blacks, still a 20 point 
difference. However, for those with the highest level of education, the percentage of 
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whites finding the election unfair dropped to 28 percent and the percentage of blacks to 47 
percent, still a 19 percentage point difference. 
Table 16: Fairness of 2000 election by race, controlled for education, National Election 
Studies sample, N= 1275 
Education: 3 
categories 
Less than HS 
HS 
More than HS 
Race: White/ 
Black 
1. White 
Fair or neither fair/unfair 55.3% 
Unfair 44.7% 
100.0% 
Fair or neither fair/unfair 56.2% 
Unfair 43.8% 
100.0% 
Fair or neither fair/unfair 71. 7% 
Unfair 28.3% 
100.0% 
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Total 
2. Black 
34.8% 50.9% 
65.2% 49.1% 
100.0% 100.0% 
36.5% 53.3% 
63 .5% 46.7% 
100.0% 100.0% 
52.9% 70.1% 
47.1% 29.9% 
100.0% 100.0% 
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Figure 7: Percent rating 2000 election 'unfair' by race, controlled for education 
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Running the test for income we see another case of enhancement. Looking at the three 
categories of income we see that amongst those in the lowest income category, 37 percent 
of whites and 53 percent of blacks found the election unfair. In the middle range numbers 
are similar, with 36 percent of whites and 57 percent of blacks calling the election unfair. 
In the highest income category, the point spread remains similar although the total 
percentages fall with 29 percent of whites and 52 percent of blacks giving an unfair rating. 
Table 17: Fairness of 2000 election by race, controlled for income, National Election 
Studies sample, N= 1137 
Income: 3 categories 
1. <$15,000 0. Fair or neither 
fair /unfair 
1. Unfair 
2. $15,000-$34,999 0. Fair or neither 
fair /unfair 
3. >=$35,000 
1. Unfair 
0. Fair or neither 
fair/unfair 
1. Unfair 
Race: White/ 
Black 
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1. White 
62.8% 
37.2% 
100.0% 
63.7% 
36.3% 
100.0% 
70.6% 
29.4% 
100.0% 
Total 
2. Black 
47.3% 60.3% 
52.7% 39.7% 
100.0% 100.0% 
42.9% 61.3% 
57.1 % 38.7% 
100.0% 100.0% 
48.3% 69.1% 
51.7% 30.9% 
100.0% 100.0% 
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.3. >=$35,000 
Figure 8: Percent rating 2000 election 'unfair' by race, controlled for income. 
And for party affiliation we see, again, that although party played a role, it is not as 
significant as the race factor. Forty one percent of white Democrats rated the election 
unfair as opposed to 56 percent of black Democrats. Among Independents the percentages 
change to 38 percent of whites and 61 percent of blacks. The most interesting 
phenomenon is with the Republicans, of whom 20 percent of whites and 20 percent of 
blacks delivered ratings of unfair. 
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Table 18: Fairness of 2000 election by race, controlled for partisanship, National Election 
Studies sample, N= 1255 
Party ID: 3 
categories 
1. Democrat 
2. independent 
3. Republican 
0. Fair or neither 
fair/unfair 
1. Unfair 
0. Fair or neither 
fair/unfair 
1. Unfair 
0. Fair or neither 
fair/unfair 
1. Unfair 
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Race: White/ Total 
Black 
1. White 2. Black 
58.7% 44.2% 55.2% 
41.3% 55.8% 44.8% 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
62.5% 39.4% 61.0% 
37.5% 60.6% 39.0% 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
79.7% 80.0% 79.7% 
20.3% 20.0% 20.3% 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
60 
-L-
ro 
'+-
c 
:::i 
c 50 
0 
:+:i (..) 
(1) 
(1) 40 
O') 
c 
ro 
(..) 
~ 30 c 
(1) 
Party ID: 3 categori 
(..) 
L-
(1) 
a.. .1. Democrat 
20 
2. Independent 
10 
.3. Republican 
1. White 2. Black 
Race: White/Black 
Figure 9: Percent rating 2000 election 'unfair' by race, controlled for partisanship. 
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Will these attitudes affect turnout in future elections? We begin by examining national 
participation in 1996. NES data show that 76 percent of registered whites voted in that 
election compared to 65 percent of blacks. Those percentages increased to 75 percent of 
whites and 73 percent of blacks in 2000. 51 
51 National Election Studies 
49 
CHAPTER SIX: THE FUTURE 
So what effect will these attitudes have on turnout in the 2004 election? The National 
Coalition on Black Civic Participation (NCBCP) has published a preliminary estimate of 
black voter turnout in 2002 based on anecdotal evidence gathered from its Operation Big 
Vote (OBV) and Black Youth Vote (BYV!) field sites in 60 cities and 27 states. According 
to this data, black turnout was about 43 percent compared with 27 percent in 1998. 
Turnout among whites and other racial groups was 55 percent (up from 36.5 percent in 
1998). 
However in South Florida, there was a considerable decrease in voter turnout. In Broward 
County, overall turnout in 2002 was 35.4 percent (20.4 percent among blacks). In Miami-
Dade County, turnout was 53 percent (20.3 percent among blacks). In Palm Beach County, 
turnout was 46 percent (13.8 percent among blacks). 52 
At a panel discussion held shortly after the 2002 elections, members of the NCBCP 
suggested that candidates stop blaming their losses on low voter turnout and focus on 
creating clear messages and agendas. 53 
52 The National Colation on Black Civic Participation, 
http://www.bigvote.org/content2002/black _voter_ turnout/black_ voter_ turnout_projections.htm 
53 Conventional Wisdom Challenged In Analysis Of Black Voter Turnout During NCBCP's Recent Post 
Election Briefing http://www. bigvote. org/postelection.htm 
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"According to anecdotal evidence collected from NCBCP sites in 60 cities across the 
country, blacks went to the polls at about the same rate they did in past midterm elections," 
said Melanie Campbell executive director and CEO of the NCBCP. "You cannot assume 
that blacks will vote for a particular party. Voters must be educated about a candidate's 
positions on the issues that matter to them and feel personally connected to a candidate."54 
The coalition acknowledged, however, that in order for blacks to make an impact, more 
than average participation will be required. "We do have to leap tall buildings," said Rev. 
Jesse Jackson, Sr., president of the Rainbow/PUSH Coalition. "Those who are behind have 
got to run faster." 
In order to increase participation in the black community, University of Maryland 
Professor Ronald Walters, said candidates need to address black issues. In 2002, "they 
didn't hear anyone talking about their issues, employment, the downturn in the economy, 
health, crime, drug treatment programs," Walters said.55 
Some political strategists, while recognizing the problem, are having more trouble agreeing 
on a solution. 
"If the Republican base is energized and the African-American community is not, that 
spells disaster for Democrats in the South," said Morris Reid, a former aide to Ron Brown, 
54 Ibid 
55 Ibid 
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the late secretary of commerce under President Clinton. 56 
In recent years, the winning Democratic formula in the South has been for candidates to 
win 95 percent of an energized black vote, while picking up 42 or 44 percent of the white 
vote. But Democratic candidates who don't activate enough blacks to votes will continue to 
struggle in areas that are turning into Republican strongholds. 57 
In a series of interviews with scholars, political operatives and black community activists, a 
troubling picture emerged for Democrats: The party is suffering from candidates who often 
don't relate to the black community, who don't campaign there aggressively-sometimes 
for fear of alienating equally important white swing voters-and who in general mishandle 
their relationship with the African-Americans. The absence of Bill Clinton, who forged an 
extraordinary personal and political bond with African-Americans, may also be hurting the 
party when it comes to turnout. All of those factors appeared to have been in play on 
Tuesday, where in county after county across the South, black support was solid but not 
enthusiastic enough to create Democratic victories. 58 
"I think you can assume that African-American turnout (in 2002) was not what they 
thought it would be," said Democratic strategist and pollster Celinda Lake. "The other 
thing is that it looks like [white] born-again Christian turnout was high. They had been 
56 Boehlert, Eric, "Did Blacks Stay Home?", http: //wv .. rw.salon.cmn/news/feature/2002/11/09/black voters/ 
57 Ibid 
58 Ibid 
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declining over the last 10 years, while African-American and union turnout has been 
increasing." 59 
But the idea of Democrats pointing fingers at blacks does not sit well with some 
community leaders, suggesting that the longtime allies have some tension to resolve. "I'm 
baffled to hear people think it's the black vote that's the difference," said Donna Brazile, 
Democratic strategist and Al Gore's campaign manager in 2000. Brazile indicated that 
Democratic wins in Arkansas, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Tennessee were evidence of a 
strong black turnout. 60 
Bill McBride, the Democratic candidate for governor in Florida, knew his campaign 
needed a big African-American showing to have any chance of beating Republican Gov. 
J eb Bush. But while his campaign was hoping that in turnout in Florida's three big, urban 
counties-Broward, Palm Beach and Miami-Dade-would hit 65 percent, it was actually 
closer to 45 percent. 61 
McBride, a white, middle-aged, wealthy attorney, essentially conceded the black vote to his 
opponent Janet Reno in the Democratic primary. Then, when he'd won the nomination, he 
59 Ibid 
60 Ibid 
61 Ibid 
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passed over another primary opponent, state senator Daryl Jones, who is black, for 
lieutenant governor and picked a white running mate. 62 
Strategists suggest the choice was made in hopes of winning over white swing voters. 
Blacks, meanwhile, watched and fumed. When McBride finally campaigned with Clinton 
in African-American communities four days before the election, it was too little, too late. 
Although McBride probably wouldn't have been saved even with a 65 percent turnout, 
there were close races in the South, like the campaign for governor in Alabama or the 
Senate campaign in Missouri, where Democrat Jean Carnahan lost by just one percentage 
point, where the participation of more black voters would have made a difference. 
North Carolina's Erskine Bowles enjoyed overwhelming support from blacks in published 
pre-election polls. Yet his Republican opponent, Elizabeth Dole, actually won several 
major metropolitan counties with sizable minority populations. To many analysts, that 
indicates the black turnout was not strong.63 
Guilford County, North Carlina, for example, is 30 percent black. Despite polls going into 
Election Day showing Dole was favored by just 7 percent of blacks, she carried Guilford. 
In South Carolina, the voter activist group Palmetto Project analyzed votes from 
predominantly black counties, and concluded that Democratic Gov. Jim Hodges, running 
62 Ibid 
63 Ibid 
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for reelection, lost 11 percent of the black vote he garnered in 1998. Most likely those black 
voters stayed home, says project director Steve Skardon. 64 
The Georgia gubernatorial race presents an interesting case study. Democratic candidate 
Roy Barnes did better in DeKalb County, which includes Atlanta and is 54 percent black, 
in 2002 than he did in 1998, increasing his margin of victory there by 16,000 votes. 65 
But elsewhere, particularly in smaller counties, a different story played out. In Baldwin 
County, which is 45 percent black and which Barnes carried in 1998, his vote tally fell 26 
percent and he lost the county to his Republican challenger, Sonny Perdue. Small counties 
such as Coffee, Crisp, Dodge, Toombs and Worth, which each have a black population of 
30 percent or more, each went Republican in 2002 after voting for Barnes in 1998. With no 
evidence that blacks suddenly switched parties, analysts assume that black turnout was not 
high or was simply overshadowed by a heavy Christian conservative showing. 66 
The Orlando Mayor's race in February 2003 provided another case study. Even though the 
race evolved into a campaign about race, turnout was lowest in the Parramore community 
and other black majority districts.67 
64 Ibid 
65 Ibid 
66 Ibid 
67 Ibid 
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Some African-American leaders cautioned that the 2002 results were not just about blacks. 
"Black and white, it's like mashed potatoes and gravy," commented Brazile. "But you need 
the mashed potatoes first. Unless you have substantial white support, the black votes won't 
make it on their own. "68 
"A great African-American turnout is just not going to happen every time," said Matthew 
Corrigan, a fellow at the University of North Florida's Center for Public Policy and 
Leadership. "Democrats relied too much on an extraordinary African-American turnout vs. 
a decent turnout, and without Clinton around, that's difficult to do."69 
In the 2004 presidential race, there are some indicators that issues important to blacks are at 
least being discussed. In January, black activist Al Sharpton became the first African 
American to seek the Democratic nomination since Jesse Jackson, who ran in 1984 and 
1988, and L. Douglas Wilder, the Virginia governor who briefly ran in 1992. Former U.S. 
Senator Carol Moseley Braun of Illinois has also expressed interest in entering the race. 
But political operatives like Brazile, the first black campaign manager in a presidential 
contest, worry that the presence of activists such as Sharpton might do more to hurt the 
black cause than to help it. 
68 Ibid 
69 lbid 
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She has announced plans to find blacks to run as favorite sons in various states' presidential 
primaries, like Rep. Jim Clyburn in South Carolina, Rep. Harold Ford in Tennessee, 
Detroit's Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick in Michigan, former New Orleans mayor Marc Morial 
in Louisiana. 
Brazile says blacks in key states are more likely to be motivated by recognizable figures 
from those states than white candidates such as North Carolina Sen. John Edwards or 
Massachusetts Sen. John Kerry. Her fear is that without more black candidates in the mix, 
Sharpton will win a number of black votes by default.70 
Brazile reportedly persuaded Moseley Braun to consider a run for the same reason. 
"The Democratic Party is running on the same tank of gas we had in 1992," Brazile said. 
"We have not broadened the electorate." 71 
70Politics 1, The 2004 Presidency, http://www.politics l .com/dems04.htm#braun 
71 Politics 1, The 2004 Presidency, http: //ww\v.politicsl.com/dems04.htm#braun 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
The data clearly show blacks are more likely to whites to view the 2000 election as being 
unfair. 
According to Hanes Walton, a political scientist at the University of Michigan, the black 
presidential vote assumes "a fourfold significance." First, many analysts consider it a 
measure of black political participation and influence. Second, a cohesive black vote is 
recognized as being potentially pivotal in a close race, third, the black vote constitutes "a 
symbolic and substantive expression of black values and preferences through interest-group 
articulation and preferences," and fourth, the black presidential vote is an instrument of 
political brokering and bargaining of black leaders, seeking to serve black interests by 
influencing the presidency. 72 
There are many variables that point to a downturn in trust and efficacy, particularly among 
black voters: 
• In Orange County, the percentage of those registered who voted in 1992 was 76 
percent. In 2000, that percentage dropped to 68 percent. However, among blacks 
age 18 and older, 27 percent were registered in 1992 with 21 percent voting. In 
72 Rueter, Theodore, The Politics of Race, African Americans and the Political System, 1995, M.E. Sharpe, 
Inc, page 17. 
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2000 registration among blacks jumped to 32 percent, however the voting 
percentage remained the same - 21 percent. 73 
• The percentage of blacks who trust the federal government only some or none of 
the time increased from 65 percent in 1996 to 67 percent in 2000. (whites were 68 
percent in 1996 and 54 percent in 2000). 74 
• Correspondingly, the percentage of blacks who trust the federal government most 
of the time/just about always declined from 35 percent in 1996 to 32 percent in 
2000. (whites were 32 percent in 1996 and 46 percent in 2000).75 
• While the trust in government index for whites rose 6 points between 1996 and 
2000 (31 to 37), the score for blacks dropped a point, from 36 to 35.76 
An analysis prepared for the Democratic National Committee following the 2002 election 
indicated that while early indicators of low black turnout in 2002 may be exaggerated, there 
remains a disparity between voting habits of blacks and whites that will have to be 
addressed before elections can be more closely representative of the citizenship. 
"While there was no overall discernable downward trend, (black) precinct turnout 
continues to trail that of (whites), undermining our ability to win close races," the memo 
states. "We are failing to build upon and expand our (black) electorate." 77 
73 Orange County Supervisor of Elections 
74 National Election Studies 
75 Ibid 
76 Ibid 
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The 2002 analysis shows whites voting an average of 10 points higher than blacks. To 
narrow that gap, Democrats are now planning to galvanize younger voters - the fastest 
growing segment of potential base voters. 
The memo also warns of tough Republican tactics in 2004. 
"Republicans are well-positioning themselves to suppress the turnout of African American 
voters via their specific negative attacks asserting that African Americans are taken for 
granted and Democrats are out of touch with the values of the community," it states. 
"Unfortunately, many of the post election headlines by 'black leaders' criticizing the party's 
efforts will find their way into Republican black communications in the 2004 cycle, further 
helping Republicans dissuade African Americans from voting." 78 
If history is an indication, a decrease in efficacy, combined with the disengagement black 
voters experienced as a result of the 2000 election and a continuation of power politics, will 
likely take years to rectify. 
77 Black Voter 2002 Off-year Turnout Believed Higher Than Usual, 
http://www.nbfea.com/NEWS/news03/commentsN oter _2002 _Off-year.html 
78 Ibid 
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APPENDIX: 
COMMUNITY SURVEY 
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COMMUNITY SURVEY 
We're interested in your opinions. Answers will be kept confidential. 
Please check the appropriate box for the following questions: 
1. Are you currently registered to vote? 
2. Did you vote in the 2000 presidential race? 
3. Have you voted in any other presidential race? 
4. Do you plan to vote in the 2004 presidential race? 
5. Have you ever voted in a state governor's race? 
6. Did you vote in the March 12 Orlando City Council race? 
7. Have you ever voted in a previous city or county race? 
8. Have you ever voted in a federal congressional race? 
9. Do you plan to vote in the 2002 governor's/congressional race? 
10. Do you believe the 2000 election was fairly decided? 
11. Do you believe your vote did or would have made a difference in deciding the 
2000 election? 
12. Do you believe that every vote carries equal weight? 
13. Do you believe that every citizen of this country has an equal chance of being 
elected to political office? 
14. Based on what you have read or heard, do you think votes cast by blacks were 
fairly counted in the 2000 presidential election? 
15. Do you think there were efforts made to disproportionately keep blacks from 
voting or to invalidate black votes? 
16. On the whole, how would you rate the process of voting in Orange County? 
Thank you for your help. 
Yes No 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
OVery Difficult 0 Difficult 0 Neither Difficult nor Easy 0 Easy OVery Easy 
Don't 
know 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
17. If you have voted in Central Florida in the last five years, how would you rate the atmosphere at your polling place? 
CJVery Intimidating 0 Intimidating 0 Neither Intimidating nor Friendly CJ Friendly OVery Friendly 
18. If you have not voted in Central Florida in the last five years, how do you perceive the atmosphere at your polling place? 
CJVery Intimidating 0 Intimidating 0 Neither Intimidating nor Friendly 0 Friendly OVery Friendly 
19. Do you live in either of the following communities? 0 Parramore 0 Callahan-Arlington Heights 0 Neither 
20. If so, how long have you lived there? 0 0-4 years 0 5-9 years 010-20 years 0 21 years or more 
21 . There 's been a lot of talk about redeveloping Parramore. That means tearing down a lot of older homes to make way for 
offices (such as Hughes Office Supply) and the Florida A&M Law School. In general, do you think the effect of these 
initiatives on the community would be: OVery Good CJGood 0 Neither Good nor Bad 0 Bad OVery Bad 
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COMMUNITY SURVEY 
We're interested in your opinions. Answers will be kept confidential. Thank you for your help. 
22 . UCF is looking at getting involved in Parramore on several levels - assisting with environmental problems, providing 
health screenings for children, working with Habitat for Humanity and homebuyers groups to assist residents in purchasing 
homes. In general, do you think the impact on the community from UCF's work on these projects would be: 
OVery Good OGood 0 Neither Good nor Bad 0 Bad OVery Bad 
23 . Do you think your neighborhood would benefit from voter education efforts including voter machine demonstrations and 
overviews of sample ballots? Yes 0 No 0 Don't know 0 
24 . Do you think voter education in your neighborhood would encourage people to vote? Yes 0 No 0 Don't know 0 
25 . How satisfied are you with the following city services in your neighborhood? 
a. Trash collection: 0 Very satisfied OSomewhat satisfied 0 Not very satisfied 0 Not at all satisfied 
b. Police services : 0 Very satisfied OSomewhat satisfied 0 Not very satisfied 0 Not at all satisfied 
c. Fire services: 0 Very satisfied D Somewhat satisfied 0 Not very satisfied 0 Not at all satisfied 
d. City services in general: 0 Very satisfied 0 Somewhat satisfied 0 Not very satisfied 0 Not at all satisfied 
26 . How often do you trust national government to do what is right? 
OJust about always 0 Most of the time OSome of the time 0 Almost never 
27 . How often do you trust local government to do what is right? 
OJust about always 0 Most of the time DSome of the time 0 Almost never 
28. Do you receive any state or federal aid (welfare, food stamps, Medicaid, Social Security, etc)? Yes 0 No 0 
29 . Gender: 0 Female 0 Male 
30 . Family: 0 Never married D Married 0 Divorced 0 Separated 0 Widowed 
31. How many children? __ _ 
32 . Do you own your home? Yes 0 No 0 
33 . Are either your parents, siblings, aunts, uncles or grandparents living with you? Yes 0 No 0 
34 . Your age: ___ _ 
35 . Your race: OWhite OBlack Olatino OAsian OOther 
36. Your education: OSome High School 0 High School diplomaiGED 0 Technical School graduate 
0 Associate Degree 0 Bachelor degree or higher 
Please share any additional comments: 
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